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strong licensing requirements -including coverage constraints- are imposed on
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requirements for potential entrants and the impact of entry on the cost of the
universal service.
Document type : Document de travail (Working Paper)
Référence bibliographique
Copée, Pierre ; Gautier, Axel ; Lefèvre, Mélanie. Promoting Competition at the Digital Age with an
Application to Belgium. CORE DISCUSSION PAPER ; 2015/51 (2015) 21 pages
 2015/51 
 
 
■ 
 
 
 
 
Promoting competition at the digital age with an 
application to Belgium 
 
Pierre Copée, Axel Gautier and Mélanie Lefèvre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORE 
Voie du Roman Pays 34, L1.03.01 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Tel (32 10) 47 43 04 
Fax (32 10) 47 43 01 
E-mail: immaq-library@uclouvain.be 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-44508.html!
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2015/51 
 
Promoting competition at the digital age with an application to 
Belgiuma 
Pierre Copéeb, Axel Gautierc and Mélanie Lefèvred  
December 6, 2015 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we develop a fully-fledged postal market model to assess the 
extent of competition in the mail market in a context of declining mail volumes 
due to e-substitution. Our focus will be on the Belgian market situation that is 
interesting for at least two reasons. First, the homogenous nature of the country 
implies that the extent of the entrant's market coverage will be either limited to 
the few very densely populated areas or large covering the whole country at the 
exception of the few very sparely populated areas. Second, because strong 
licensing requirements -including coverage constraints- are imposed on 
competing postal operators and they may constitute barrier to entry. Our model 
allows us to estimate the extent of entry, the cost of meeting the licensing 
requirements for potential entrants and the impact of entry on the cost of the 
universal service. 
 
Keywords: Postal sector, e-substitution, universal service 
JEL Codes: L51, L87 
                                                            
a The authors are grateful to Michael Crew, Tim Brennan, Carla Pace, Axel Desmedt, 
Robert Campbell, Ian Streule, W. Vergote and participants at the 23rd CRII conference 
on postal and delivery economics.   
Disclosure: this work was funded by the University of Liege. 
b University of Liege (ULg), HEC Liege.   
c University of Liege (ULg), LCII and HEC Liege and CORE, Université catholique de 
Louvain. E-mail: agautier@ulg.ac.be 
d University of Liege (ULg), HEC Liege and LICOS Centre for Institutions and 
Economic Performance, KU Leuven. E-mail: melanie.lefevre@ulg.ac.be 
2"
1.)Introduction)"The" postal" sector" has" undergone" dramatic" changes" over" the" recent" years" under" the"double" effect" of" liberalization" and" increased" competition" from" alternative"communication" channels" (eBsubstitution)."As" a" result," the"mail" volume"handled"by" the"historical" operator" has" declined" sharply" (Nikali," 2008;" Fève"et-al.," 2010;"Meschi" et-al.,"2010)." In" the" long" run," declining" volumes" may" affect" both" the" extent" of" postal"competition" in" the"market"and" the" sustainability"of" the"universal"postal" service" (Crew"and"Kleindorfer,"2005)"with"the"two"dimensions"being"intrinsically"linked"(Gautier"and"Wauthy,"2012)."""""In"most" of" Europe," postal"markets" have" been" fully" liberalized" since" 2010." Alternative"postal"operators,"provided" that" they"satisfy" licensing" requirements," can"offer"products"and"services"without"any"restriction."Newcomers"in"the"postal"markets"have"adopted"an"alternative" business" model." They" target" commercial" mail" of" large" senders" for" which"collection" and" sorting" costs" are" limited." They" deliver" mail" less" frequently" than" the"incumbent"operators"(usually"two"or"three"days"a"week)"and"they"may"not"cover"all"the"national" territory." " So" far," the" development" of" competition" is" unequal" among"Member"States." Some" countries" (Netherlands," Sweden," Germany)" experience" largeBscale"competition"from"alternative"operators,"while"others"have"minimal"competition."""""The"development"of"competition—from"postal"or"other"digital"operators—is"seen"as"a"threat" for" the" sustainability" of" the" universal" service." " There" are" two" reasons" for" that."Firstly," competitors" target" mainly" the" profitable" market" segments," leaving" the" less"profitable" ones" to" the" universal" service" provider" that"must" serve" them" as" part" of" the"Universal" Service" Obligations" (USO)" (a" phenomenon" known" as" 'cherryBpicking')."Secondly,"there"are"important"economies"of"scales"in"mail"delivery.""If"competition"from"postal" competitors" or" electronic" communication" erodes" mail" volumes," the" average"delivery"cost"increases"for"a"given"delivery"frequency."For"these"reasons,"the"question"of"entry" cannot" be" totally" separated" from" the" question" of" designing" and" financing" the"universal"service.1"""Our"objective"in"this"paper"is"to"develop"a"model"of"competition"to"assess"its"extent"in"a"context"of"declining"mail"volumes."Our"focus"will"be"on"the"Belgian"market," interesting"for" two"reasons."Firstly,"despite"a"high"population"density,"postal"competition"remains"limited," compared" for" instance" to"The"Netherlands,"with" currently" one" active" licensed"smallBscale" operator" (TBCBPOST).Secondly," licensing" requirements" imposed" on" postal"operators" are" strong." Licensed" operators" have" the" obligation" to" deliver" mail" twice" a"week"on"80%"of"the"territory."More"precisely"they"have"to"cover"80%"of"the"territory"in"each"of"the"three"regions"of"Belgium"(Flanders,"Wallonia"and"Brussels)" five"years"after"they"begin"to"operate,"according"to"the"following"timeline:"1st"year:"10%,"2nd"year:"20%,"3rd"year:"40%,"4th"year:"60%"and"5th"year"80%."These"strong"licensing"requirements"may"deter"entry."""
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""1"The"universal"service"and"its"financing"are"not"competitively"neutral"(Borsenberger"et-
al.,"2010;"Gautier"and"Wauthy,"2012),"implying"that"a"change"in"the"scope"of"the"USO"is"likely"to"have"an"impact"on"the"extent"of"competition"on"the"market."
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The"first"step" in"the"analysis" is" to"assess"the"extent"of"unconstrained"entry"to"evaluate"whether" or" not" the" licensing" obligations" act" as" a" constraint." In" a" second" step,"we" can"evaluate" the" cost" of" meeting" the" licensing" obligations." If" this" cost" is" prohibitive," the"coverage"constraint"is"a"barrier"to"entry."Last,"we"can"evaluate"the"impact"of"entry"on"the"sustainability"of"the"universal"service.2""""To"that"end,"we"develop"a"fullyBfledged"model"of"postal"competition."The"cost"structure"of"the"postal"operators" is"based"on"Roy"(1999)"and"the"competition"model" is"based"on"d'Alcantara"and"Gautier"(2008)"and"Gautier"and"Paolini"(2011)."Section"2"is"devoted"to"the"cost"model,"while"the"market"model" is"exposed" in"section"3."Simulation"results"are"shown"in"section"4."We"present" two"scenarios,"one"with" the"current"mail"volumes," the"other" where" volumes" decline" by" 40%." Section" 5" analyses" the" impact" of" the" licensing"requirements"imposed"in"Belgium."At"current"mail"volumes,"we"estimate"that"the"cost"of"licensing" requirements" is" moderate" but" if" volumes" fall" by" 40%" this" cost" becomes"prohibitive"for"the"entrant."In"the"context"of"eBsubstitution,"there"appears"to"be"room"for"profitable"entry"unless"the"current"licensing"requirements"are"maintained."We"also"show"that" competition" and" eBsubstitution" have" a" strong" impact" on" the" incumbent's" average"delivery"cost"which"may"in"turn"weaken"its"ability"to"sustain"the"universal"service.""This"is"discussed"in"section"6."Finally,"section"7"concludes.""
2.)Cost)Model)"
2.1)Cost)of)outdoor)delivery)work))"We"compute"the"cost"of"the"outdoor"delivery"work"(ODW)"following"the"approach"of"Roy"(1999),"which"is"based"on"Jasinski"and"Steggles"(1977)"and"Cohen"and"Chu"(1997)."The"delivery" cost" is" broken" down" into" four" categories:" travel" (active" route)," stopping,"delivery"and" loading."Due"to"a" lack"of"available"data," the"cost"of" travel" to"and"from"the"delivery"unit"to"the"route"is"ignored."""Three"processes-j"may"be"used"for"delivery:"foot,"bike"or"car."The"daily"cost3"of"outdoor"delivery"work"on"a"given"area-i"using"process-j"is"given"by:""!!" = !!!" + !!!! " (1)"""where"w"is"the"hourly"salary"of"the"carrier,"Tij"is"the"time"of"the"delivery"round"in"area"i"using"process"j,"vj"is"the"vehicle"cost"per"kilometer"with"process"j"and"Li"is"the"length"of"
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""2"To"maintain"the"sustainability"of"the"universal"service,"Member"States"have"on"the"one"hand," safeguarded" the" USO" financing" by" installing" dedicated" funding" for" the" USO"(compensation"fund"and/or"state"aid)"and,"on"the"other"hand,"reformed"the"USO"itself.""The"USO"reforms"concern"all"the"dimensions"of"the"universal"service:"the"product"bundle"included" in" the" definition" of" the" USO," the" pricing" constraints" applied" to" the" universal"service" providers" (uniform" pricing," special" rates," commercial" freedom)" and" the"definition" of" the" universal" service" itself" (accessibility" of" contact" points," doorstep"delivery,"delivery"frequency)."""3"Precisely,"!!"is" the" cost" of" the" outdoor" delivery"work" per" delivery" day," such" that" the"weekly"cost"is"!!"!"where"d"is"the"delivery"frequency"per"week."
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delivery"round"in"area"i."Note"that"vj"is"assumed"to"be"zero"when"the"delivery"is"done"by"foot"or"by"bike.""The"time"for"the"route"is"measured"as:"!!" =!! !"#$%!"#$!!"#$!" + !! !"#$"%&'! + !! !"#$%"&'!!"#$ +!!!!"#$ !"#$%&'!!"#$ !!(2)"The"first"element"corresponds"to"active"route"time,"that"is,"the"time"used"by"the"postman"to"travel"in"the"delivery"area"i"where"!! "is"the"number"of"stops"the"delivery"man"has"to"do"in" the"area"and" !"#$%&#'(!!"#$!" !is" the"average" time"necessary" to" travel" the"distance"between"two"stops"in"this"area"using"process" j."Let"!"##$!" "be"the"speed"of"vehicle" j"on"area"i,"and"!! ,"the"length"of"roads"in"area"i,"we"have:"""!"#$%&#'(!!"#$!" = !!/!!!"##$!"" (3)"""The"second"element"of"(2)"is"the"stopping"time."It"is"the"product"of"the"numbers"of"stops"in" the" area"!! "and" the" time" spent" at" each" stop" using" process" j" (entering" a" building,"walking"up"a"path,"parking"the"vehicle,"etc.)."""The"third"element"is"related"to"the"delivery"(or"drop):"delivery-time"is"the"time"necessary"to"remove"the"mail"from"the"bag"and"posting"it"through"the"mailbox."While"it"may"not"be"exactly" the" case" in" practice," we" assume," following" Roy" (1999)," that" this" operation"generates" the" same"average" individual" time" for" each"object."Qi" is" the"number"of" items"delivered"in"the"area"i"and"is"obtained"by"multiplying"the"number"of"items"delivered"per"inhabitant"per"day"q"by"the"population"of"the"area"popi.""""The"last"element"of"(2)"comes"for"the"use"of"relay"boxes"when"the"process"used"implies"capacity"constraints."It"is"typically"the"case"for"deliveries"by"foot"or"by"bike."!!"#$ "is"the"maximum"number"of"items"that"can"be"transported"at"once"with"process" j,"and" loading-
time"is"the"time"necessary"to"remove"the"mail"from"the"relay"box"and"putting"it"into"the"delivery"bag.""The" number" of" stops"!! "in" area" i" depends" on" the" number" of" delivery" points" and" the"probability"of"distributing"mails"at"a"given"delivery"point"i.e."the"probability"of"making"a"stop"at"a"delivery"point."The"number"of"delivery"points" is"measured"by" the"number"of"buildings"!! "in"area"i."The"probability"of"delivering"a"mail"at"a"given"stop"point"depends"on"the"grouping"index"!! "which"is"the"ratio"of"the"number"households"ℎ! "to"the"number"of"buildings:"!! = ℎ!/!! "(Boldron"et"al.,"2007)"and"the"total"mail"volume"delivered"in"the"area." "We"follow"Roy"(1999)"and"we"model"the"probability"that"a"household"receives"a"mail" item"as"a"Poisson"process." " If"at" least"one"household"in"a"building"receives"a"mail,"then" the" delivery"man" has" to"make" a" stop;"with" a" Poisson" process," this" probability" is"given"by"!"# !!!!! !! "and"it"increases"with"the"grouping"index"and"the"total"mail"volume."""The"number"of"stops"is"then"given"by:""!! = !! 1− !"# !!!!! !! " (4)"
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"Using" data" for" Belgium," we" calculate" the" daily" cost"!!" "for" each" of" the" three" possible"delivery" processes." Then,"we" choose" the" process"with" the"minimum" cost." The" chosen"process"is"assumed"to"be"the"same"for"the"entire"area"i"while"it"can"differ"from"one"area"to"the"other.""Hence"the"daily"cost"of"outdoor"delivery"work"on"a"given"area"i"is:""!! = !"#!!!" " (5)"""Using"this"cost"model,"we"compute"the"daily"cost"of"outdoor"delivery"work"for"different"values"of"the"delivered"items"per"inhabitant"q.""We"then"simulate"the"effect"of"a"change"of"the"number"of" items"delivered"each"day" in"the"area"Qi"on"the"daily"cost"!! ."Using"these"simulated"costs,"we"estimate"a"linear"cost"function"for"the"outside"delivery"work"in"area"
i:""!! = ! + !!! + !!! + !! " (6)""where"! "and"! "are" parameters" to" be" estimated,"! "is" a" vector" of" parameters" to" be"estimated,"Xi" is"a"vector"of"variables"representing"the"characteristics"of"area" i" (density,"length"of"roads,"number"of"households,"number"of"buildings,"etc.)"and"!! "is"an"error"term."The"estimated"coefficient"!"can"be"interpreted"as"the"marginal"cost"of"mail.""
2.2)Data)"There" are" no" publicly" available" data" on" postal" routes." We" therefore" use," as" a" first"approximation," data" on" Belgian"municipalities" as" the" reference" point" for" defining" the"delivery"areas" i."Belgium"is"divided" into"589"municipalities"ranging"from"1"km2"to"214"km2."Most"municipalities"(88%)"have"a"density"lower"than"1000"inhabitants"per"km2"but"some"are"densely"populated"(up"to"22048"inhabitants"per"km2)."For"each"municipality,"we" collected" administrative" demographic" and" geographic" data" from" several" public"services"websites."Descriptive"statistics"and"sources"are"given"in"Table"1."" Table"1:"Descriptive"statistics"
Variable) ) mean) s.d.) Source)Density"(inhabitants/km2)" " 727" (1957.44)" SPF"Economiea"Population"(inhabitants)" popi- 18257" (29021.9)" SPF"Economiea"Length"of"roads"(km)"" Li- 198.1" (143.53)" SPF"Mobilitéb"Number"of"households"" hi- 7832" (13791.2)" SPF"Economiea"Number"of"buildings" ni- B6049.6" (7734.51)" Statbela"Grouping"index"" gi- 1.19" (0.445)" gi=-hi/ni-Number"of"stops"" si- 5577.2" (7329.43)" Equation"(4)"Number"of"observations:"589."a"Data"2009"b"Data"2013""
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In"order"to"calibrate"the"cost"model,"we"formulate"a"number"of"hypotheses"(see"Table"2"in"the"appendix)."""
2.3)Cost)estimation)"Equation"(5)"is"calibrated"for"the"589"Belgian"municipalities"using"data"and"hypotheses"presented" in"Tables"1"and"2."For" the"annual"number"of" items"per" capita"x,"we"use" the"figures"provided"by"WIK"(2013)"for"the"year"2011:"233"items"per"capita."We"divided"it"by"5"working"days"and"52"weeks"to"obtain"the"number"of"items"delivered"by"inhabitant"per"day"(0.9)"that"is"considered"to"be"the"same"in"all"areas."""Figure" 1" shows" the" results" for" the" unit" cost" ( !!/!! )" per" municipality," where"municipalities"are"presented"from"the"most"to"the"least"densely"populated."Average"unit"cost" of" outdoor"delivery"work" is" 0.147€"per" item." From"Figure"1,"we" can" see" that" the"country" is" somewhat" homogenous" with" few" very" densely" or" sparsely" populated"municipalities."Indeed,"the"average"delivery"cost"per"quintile"is"almost"identical"for"Q2,"Q3"and"Q4"(=0.157,"0.164"and"0.174),"while"it"is"substantially"lower"for"Q1"(0.118)"and"higher" for"Q5"(0.235)."Given" that"municipalities"have"similar"costs" in" the" three"middle"quintiles,"it"is"expected"that"the"entrant"will"either"cover"all"or"none"of"them"(d'Alcantara"and"Gautier,"2008).""" Figure"1:"Unit"cost"of"outdoor"delivery"work""
""We"then"calibrate"this"equation"(5)"for"the"589"Belgian"municipalities"allowing"changes"in"the"number"of"items"delivered"by"inhabitant,"using"x-=-{100,-233,-400}.""This"provides"us"with"1767"observations"from"which"we"can"estimate"equation"(6)."Table"3"shows"the"results"of"the"estimation."""
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Table"3:"OLS"estimation:"daily"cost"of"outdoor"delivery"work""
) Coefficient) SE"Items"delivered"in"the"area"(Qi)" 0.0467***" (0.0004)"Length"of"roads"(li)" 2.3048***" (0.0617)"Number"of"buildings"(ni)" 0.1580***" (0.0026)"Number"of"households"(hi)" 0.0139***" (0.0017)"Density" B0.0364***" (0.0040)"Constant" 44.5569***" (12.8923)"N" 1767" "R2" 0.992" "***"Significant"at"1%"level."""This" estimation" strategy" allows" us" to" disentangle" the" delivery" cost" in" area" i" into" (i)" a"marginal"cost"of"outdoor"delivery"per"item"and"(ii)"a"fixed"cost"of"delivery"in"area"i"that"can"be"reconstructed"using"the"characteristics"of"area" i"and"the"coefficients"of"Table"3."The"marginal" cost" is" estimated" at" 0.0467€"per" item." The" drivers" of" the" delivery" costs"have" the" expected" sign." The" cost" decreases" with" the" density" and" increases" with" the"length"of"roads,"the"number"of"buildings"and"households."""
3.)Market)analysis)"
3.1)The)market)game)"As" a" next" step," we" use" the" simulated" cost" model" to" construct" market" scenarios." We"consider" two" scenarios"where" an" entrant" (E)" competes"with" the" incumbent" (I)" on" the"bulk"mail"market." In" our"market" simulations," we" consider" that" the" entrant" is" equally"efficient" as" the" incumbent." In" particular," we" consider" that" the" two" operators" use" the"same"delivery"cost"technology"represented"by"our"simulated"cost"model."""Even"if"the"two"operators"use"the"same"technology,"they"have"different"business"models."The" incumbent,"which" is"considered"to"be" the"universal"service"provider,"must"deliver"standard"and"bulk"mails"five"days"a"week."The"entrant"has"a"business"model"that"differs"in"three"respects"from"the"incumbent's"one."First,"the"entrant"concentrates"its"operation"on"the"bulk"mail"market"where"sorting"and"collecting"costs"are" lower."This"means"that"the"incumbent"remains"the"unique"provider"of"traditional"mail."Second,"the"entrant"has"a"lower"delivery" frequency" (d)" of" 2" days" a"week." " Last," the" entrant" is" not" committed" to"cover"the"whole"territory"and"it"may"cover"only"the"areas"i"where"it"is"profitable."""To"model" competition" on" the" bulk"mail"market,"we" assume"demand" functions" for" the"incumbent" and" the" entrant," derived" from" the" maximization" of" the" utility" of" a"representative"sender"defined"as:""
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! !! , !! = !!!! + !!!! − ! !!!! − ! !!!! − !!!!! """(7)"where"xI"and"xE"are"the"number"of"(bulk)"items"sent"with"the"incumbent"and"the"entrant,"respectively."The"asymmetry"in"business"models"is"reflected"by"the"difference"between"
αI"and"αE."All"else"equal"the"representative"sender"is"willing"to"pay"an"extra"αI"–"αE,"for"the" use" of" the" incumbent’s" service.."4"Demand" levels" xI" and" xE" are" expressed" as" mail"received"per" inhabitant" per" year." From"Equation" (7)"we" can"derive"demand" functions"corresponding" to" a" competitive" situation" (if" area" i" is" covered" by" both" I" and" E)" and" a"monopolistic"situation"(if"area"i"is"only"covered"by"I).""""The"timing"of"the"game"is"the"following."The"incumbent"first"sets"its"price"for"bulk"and"standard"mails." Then" the" entrant" decides" on" its" price" and" on" its" area" coverage."With"sequential"price"choices," there" is"no"strategic" limitation"of" the"coverage" (Valletti"et-al.,"2002)"and"the"price"equilibrium"always"exists"(Gautier"and"Wauthy,"2010).""Given"prices"
(pI,-pE),"the"mail"volume"captured"by"the"entrant"is"equal"to"xE(pI,-pE)"per"inhabitant.""The"entrant's"coverage"will"consist"of"all"the"areas"i"where"operations"are"profitable,"that"is"all"areas"i"satisfying:""!!" = !! − !! !!!"!! − 52!!!(!!") ≥ 0,""where"!!" = !!!"!!!"! "" is" the" number" of" items" delivered" by" the" entrant" on" area" i" per"delivery"day"and"cu"the"upstream"cost"of"mails"(collection,"transport,"sorting…).""""
3.2)Calibration)of)the)model))"To" calibrate" these" demand" functions," our" starting" point" is" a" reference" monopoly"scenario" in" which" the" incumbent" operator" is" the" unique" postal" operator." In" this"monopolistic" case," the" price" of" bulk"mail" is" pI"=" 0.5€" and" at" this" price," the" bulk"mail"volume"is"equal"to"200"items"per"inhabitant"per"year."The"price"of"the"standard"mail"is"0.72€" and," at" this" price," the"mail" volume" is" equal" to" 33"mail" items"per" inhabitant" per"year."The"prices"used"are"representative"of"the"ones"currently"observed"in"Belgium"and"the"repartition"between"B2X"and"C2X"mailed" items"roughly"corresponds"to" the" figures"provided"by"Copenhagen"Economics"(2010):"88%"for"B2X"and"12%"for"C2X""We"then"consider"that"the"entrant"would"capture"10%"of"the"market"for"bulk"mail" if" it"applies"the"same"price"as"the"incumbent."It"would"capture"50%"of"the"market"if"it"offers"a"20%"discount"with"respect"to"the"incumbent's"price."We"suppose"a"direct"price"elasticity"of" B0.4" and" a" displacement" ratio" of" 0.9." This" last" ratio" is"! = −(!!! !!!) (!!! !!!)""and" indicates" that" 90%" of" the" items" sent" by" the" entrant" are" captured" from" the"incumbent."These"parameters"are" similar" to" the"ones"used"by"De"Donder"et-al.-(2006)"and"d'Alcantara"and"Gautier"(2008).""""The"demand"functions"addressed"to"the"two"firms"are"not"totally"symmetric"as,"at"equal"prices," the" incumbent" keeps" a" higher" market" share" than" the" entrant." To" have" equal"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""4"In"an"attempt"to"estimate"the"willingness"to"pay"for"different"service"attributes,"Rohr"et-
al." (2013)"found"that," for"business"clients"there"is"a"substantial"difference"between"the"willingness"to"pay"for"a"nextBday"delivery"service"compared"to"a"delivery"within"2"or"3"days."""
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market" shares," the" entrant" should" offer" a" 20%" discount." " This" specification" aims" at"reflecting"the"fact"that"the"two"firms"have"a"different"business"model,"in"particular"their"coverage" and" delivery" frequency" differ." For" that" reason," even" if" the" entrant" offers" a"better" rate" than" the" incumbent," all" the" consumers" do" not" immediately" switch" to" the"entrant."In"our"simulation"the"cross"price"elasticity,"evaluated"at"pI=pE=0.5€"is"equal"to"0.72." This" crossBprice" elasticity" is" in" our" specification" of" the" demand" function"independent" of" the" entrant’s" coverage,"which" is" of" course" a" restriction"of" the"demand"model.""""The"upstream"cost"cu"is"set"to"0.20€"for"bulk"mail"and"0.25€"for"standard"mail,"both"for"the" incumbent" and" the" entrant." "Other" costs" (e.g." post" offices)" are"not" included" in"our"modeling.""For"this"reason,"we"will"focus"mainly"in"the"change"in"the"incumbent's"profit"after"entry"and"the"absolute"value"for"the"profit"should"be"interpreted"with"caution"as"it"does"not"include"omitted"cost."""""""""
4.)Simulation)results))"We" consider" two" scenarios." In" the" first," the" demands" are" calibrated" to" correspond" to"actual"mail"volumes"(200"bulk"items"at"a"price"pI=0.5"for"a"monopolistic"incumbent)"and"the" entrant" delivers" mails" " twice" a" week" on" part" of" the" territory." In" this" scenario," a"hypothetical"monopolistic"incumbent"realizes"a"profit"equal"to"459.05"millions"€"and"it"has"an"average" cost"of"ODW"equal" to"0.141€." In" the" second"scenario," the"mail" volume"declines"by"40%"compared"to"the"current"level."""
4.1)Market)simulations:)current)mail)volume)""The"results" for"the"current"mail"volume"scenario"are"presented"in"Table"4." " In"the"first"column," we" report" the" results" assuming" that" the" incumbent" continues" to" charge" the"current"monopoly"price"after"entry;"in"the"second"column,"the"incumbent"sets"the"profit"maximizing" prices." " For" each" simulation," we" report" prices," volumes," coverage" by" the"entrant,"profits"and"the"average"costs"of"the"ODW.""""" Table"4:"Market"simulations,"current"mail"volume""
) Passive)
Incumbent)
ProfitJ
maximizing)
Incumbent"Incumbent’s"price"(pI)" 0.5" 0.45"Entrant’s"price"(pE)"" 0.4" 0.383"Municipalities"covered"(%)" "84.38%" 65.87%"Bulk"volume"for"Incumbent"(xI)" 105" 131"Bulk"volume"for"Entrant"(xE)" 105" 86"Incumbent’s"average"cost"of"ODW"(€)" "0.200" 0.173"Entrant’s"average"cost"of"ODW"(€)" "0.125" 0.137"
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"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""The"first"thing"that"should"be"noticed"is"the"extent"of"the"entrant’s"territorial"coverage."At" current" prices," the" entrant"would" cover" 84%" of" the"municipalities" and" 66%" if" the"incumbent" sets" the" profitBmaximizing" price" assuming" entry" will" occur." " The"homogeneous" nature" of" the" country" with" a" lot" of" municipalities" with" similar" cost"conditions"explains"the"importance"of"entry.""""After"entry,"the"incumbent"optimally"decreases"its"price"by"10%,"with"its"corresponding"market"share"for"the"bulk"mail"being"equal"to"65%."This"large"market"share"is"explained"by"the"facts"that," in"the"municipalities"where"both"firms"deliver,"the"incumbent"market"share"remains"substantial"(60%)"and"the"incumbent" is"the"only"firm"delivering"mail" in"the"nonBcovered"municipalities."""""Entry"has"a"significant"impact"on"the"incumbent's"profit."Compared"to"the"monopolistic"situation," the" profit" declines" by" approximately" 52%."This" sharp"decrease" in" the" profit"results" from"both" the"businessBstealing"effect"of" entry"and" the" increase" in" the"average"cost"of"delivery"due"to"lost"scale"economies."The"incumbent's"average"cost"of"ODW"cost"increases" from" 0.141" in" the" monopoly" situation" to" 0.173€." Due" to" its" lower" delivery"frequency" and" its" selective" entry" in" the" least" costly" areas," the" entrant" has" a" lower"average" cost" of" ODW" than" the" incumbent." For" this" reason," our" simulations" show" that"there" is" room" for" profitable" entry" and" that" a" profitBmaximizing" entrant" will" limit" its""
Incumbent’s"profit"(106"€)" "212.80" 220.70"Entrant’s"profit"(106"€)" "81.10" 36.95"Territory"covered"(%)"(Belgium)" "73.41%" 54.17%"Territory"covered"(%)"(Brussels)" 100%" 100%"Territory"covered"(%)"(Flanders)" "95.48%" 83.34%"Territory"covered"(%)"(Wallonia)" "52.67%" 26.64%"Cost"of"licensing"conditions"(106"€)" 1.02" 2.81"
Cost)of)licensing)conditions)(%)of)πE)) 1.25%) 7.60%)
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territorial"coverage,"with"only"65%"of"the"municipalities"covered"mainly"in"Brussels"and"in"Flanders."""
4.2)Market)simulation:)declining)mail)volume)"In" the" second" scenario," we" consider" a" decrease" in" the" mail" volume" compared" to" the"current" situation."More" in"particular,"we" suppose" that" at" the" current" incumbent"price,"both"the"bulk"and"the"standard"mail"volume"drop"by"40%.""This"decrease"in"volume"is"in"our"view"a"reasonable"scenario"to"capture"the"longBterm"impact"of"eBsubstitution."Except"for"this"volume"change,"the"other"parameters"used"to"calibrate"the"demand"functions"are"similar."" Table"5:"Market"simulations,"declining"mail"volume"
) Passive)
Incumbent)
ProfitJ
maximizing)
Incumbent)Incumbent’s"price"(pI)" 0.5" 0.45"Entrant’s"price"(pE)"" 0.4" 0.383"Municipalities"covered"(%)" 43.97%" 7.47%"Bulk"volume"for"Incumbent"(xI)" 63" 79"Bulk"volume"for"Entrant"(xE)" 63" 51"Incumbent’s"average"cost"of"ODW"(€)" 0.267" 0.214"Entrant’s"average"cost"of"ODW"(€)" 0.160" 0.131"Incumbent’s"profit"(106"€)" 71.32" 97.46"Entrant’s"profit"(106"€)" 19.34" 5.75"Territory"covered"(%)"(Belgium)" 33.73%" 3.51%"Territory"covered"(%)"(Brussels)" 100%" 100%"Territory"covered"(%)(Flanders)" 51.97%" 5.16%"Territory"covered"(%)(Wallonia)"" 16.14%" 0.99%"Cost"of"licensing"conditions"(106"€)" 5.72" 19.64"Cost"of"licensing"conditions"(%"of"πE)" 29.59%" 341.66%"
Note:) Incumbent's"price"in"the"monopoly"case"is"0.5"for"bulk"mail"and"0.72"for"standard"mail;"volume"(number"of"items"delivered"per"capita"per"year"in"the"monopoly"case)"is"120"for"bulk"mail"and"20"for"standard"mail;"upstream"cost"is"0.20"for"bulk"mail"and"0.25"for"standard"mail;"price"elasticity"is"B0.4;"displacement"ratio"is"0.9;"the"number"of"deliveries"per"week"(d)"is"5"for"the"incumbent"and"2"for"the"entrant.)"With" declining" mail" volumes," the" coverage" of" the" entrant" falls" drastically:" it" is" only"profitable" to" cover" 7.5%" of" the" municipalities." Notice" also" that," despite" a" limited"
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coverage,"market"competition"remains"intense"as"the"price"charged"by"the"incumbent"is"similar" to" the" above" case." The" reason" is" the" homogenous" nature" of" the" country." At" a"higher"price," the"entrant"would"have"a"much" larger"coverage,"as" it" is" illustrated"by"the"passive" incumbent" case" in" the" first" column" of" Table" 5:" without" a" price" reaction," the"entrant"would"cover"more"than"40%"of"the"municipalities."The"optimal"price"set"by"the"incumbent"can"be"seen"as"a"limit"price"that"prevents"larger"scale"entry"by"the"challenger.""Thus,"even"if"the"incumbent’s"market"share"remains"important"(91%),"the"market"can"be"considered"as"very"competitive."The"incumbent"profit"falls"drastically"(B55%"compared"to" the" first" scenario)" as" a" result" of" the"decline" in"mail" volume"and" the" increase" in" the"average"cost"of"ODW."With"declining"mail"volume,"there"is"still"room"for"profitable"entry"but"at"a"much"lower"scale"than"at"the"current"mail"volume."""""
5.)Licensing)requirements)"Belgium" has" quite" unusual" and" substantive" licensing" obligations" including," (i)" the"obligation" to" deliver"mails" twice" a" week" after" two" years" of" operations," (ii)" territorial"coverage" constraints" with" the" obligation" to" cover" 80%" of" the" territory" in" all" three"regions"after"5"years"of"operations"and"(iii)"the"use"of"a"uniform"tariff."Currently,"there"is"only"one" licensed"operator"who"started" its"operation" in"May"2013"and" it"has"a" limited"market" share" (~1%)." Belgium" strong" licensing" obligations" have" been" criticized." The"European"Commission"started"an"infringement"procedure"against"Belgium"for"imposing"licensing"conditions"that"are"nonBnecessary"and"not"justified."A"recent"WIK"report"(WIK,"2015)" considers" the" licensing" conditions" to" be" a" barrier" to" entry" and" suggested" to"remove" them."Following" these" critics," the"Belgian"postal" law" is" expected" to"be" revised"soon,"particularly"on"this"point.""""Using" our"market" scenarios,"we" can" evaluate"whether" the" entrant"meets" the" licensing"requirements" and," if" not," the" cost" of"matching" them." In"Tables"4" and"5,"we" report" the"coverage"in"terms"of"both"the"percentage"of"municipalities"covered"and"the"percentage"of"the"territory"covered,"this"last"number"being"split"by"region."Coverage"constraints"in"the" licensing"obligations"are"expressed"in"terms"of"percentage"of"the"territory"with"the"80%"threshold"to"be"reach"after"5"years"in"all"the"three"regions."""If"the"entrant"fails"to"meet"this"coverage"constraint"(which"is"the"case),"we"evaluate"the"cost"of"meeting"the"licensing"conditions,"using"the"following"algorithm:"the"entrant"has"to" cover" lossBmaking"municipalities" till" it" reaches" the" 80%" coverage" constraint" in" the"three" regions" and" it" will" cover" firstly" the" municipalities" where" the" losses" are" the"smallest.5"The"cost"of"the"licensing"obligations"is"then"evaluated"as"the"lost"profit"on"the"municipalities"that"the"entrant"is"constrained"to"serve."If,"as"a"result,"the"entrant’s"profit"becomes" negative," it" is" not" possible" to" enter" profitably" the" market" and"to" meet" the"licensing"constraints."In"this"case,"the"license"is"a"barrier"to"entry.""""""At" current" mail" volumes," the" coverage" of" the" Walloon" region" (the" less" densely"populated)"is"only"26%,"far"below"the"80%"obligations"while"the"threshold"is"reached"in"the" other" two" regions." Increasing" coverage" in" Wallonia" costs" 2.81" million" €" to" the"entrant,"representing"7.6%"of"its"profit."Though"substantial"it"cannot"be"considered"as"a"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""5"Notice"that" this"does"not"preclude"that" there"are"cheaper"way"to"satisfy" the"coverage"constraint."
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barrier" to" entry." Things" are" radically" different" if" volumes" decline." In" this" case," the"coverage"constraint"is"not"satisfied"in"Flanders"(5%)"and"in"Wallonia"(1%)."We"estimate"the"cost"of"reaching"the"80%"threshold"to"19.64"million"€."This"amount"is"larger"than"the"unconstrained"profit,"which"means"that"with"declining"volumes,"the"license"constitutes"a"barrier" to" entry."We" therefore" conclude" that" a" decrease" in" the"mail" volume" combined"with" the" licensing" requirements" do" not" leave" enough" space" for" the" development" of"competition"in"the"market."""
6.)Cost)of)universal)service))"Our"model"does"not"allow"us"to"evaluate"the"cost"of"the"universal"service"as"this"would"require"the"specification"of"a"counterBfactual"scenario"without"USO.""However,"the"model"allows" us" to" evaluate" the" joint" impact" of" competition" and" eBsubstitution" on" the"incumbent’s"cost"of"ODW"and"this"cost"is"substantial"(see"Figure"2)."""If"the"incumbent"is"the"designated"universal"service"provider"and,"as"such,"it"must"deliver"mails"five"days"a"week," it" cannot" compensate" decreasing" volumes" by" a" lower" delivery" frequency." It" is"therefore" interesting" to" evaluate" and" to" decompose" the" evolution" of" the" incumbent’s"average"cost"of"ODW."In"the"monopoly"case,"this"cost"is"equal"to"0.141€;"it"increases"to"0.173€"after"entry"and"to"0.214€"if"we"combine"entry"and"declining"mail"volumes."The"total" increase" is" thus" equal" to" 0.073€" (+52%)" which" can" be" decomposed" into" an"increased"cost"due"to"entry"(0.032€,"+23%)"and"eBsubstitution"(0.041€,"+29%)."It"is"then"not"a"surprise"that"in"a"context"of"declining"volumes,"the"definition"of"the"USO"is"under"question"(Gautier"and"Poudou,"2015)."""" Figure"2:"Average"cost"of"outdoor"delivery"work"
"Note:"Incumbent's"price"in"the"monopoly"case"is"0.5"for"bulk"mail"and"0.72"for"standard"mail;"duopoly"results"and"hypotheses"are"detailed"in"table"4"column"2"for"current"volume"and"in"table"5"column"2"for"reduced"volume.""""
7.)Concluding)remarks))
)In" this" paper," we" developed" a" fullyBfledged" model" of" competition" on" the" bulk" mail"market" to" evaluate" the" impact" of" licensing" requirements" and"declining" volume"on" the"extent" of" market" competition" and" the" cost" of" the" universal" service." The" model" is"
0"0.05"
0.1"0.15"
0.2"0.25"
Monopoly" Duopoly,""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""current"volume" Duopoly, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""reduced"volume"
Incumbent" Entrant"
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constructed"using"publicly"available"data"and"could"be"refined"further"with"more"precise"data"at"the"postal"route"level."""Our"estimations"show"that"there"is"room"for"profitable"entry"in"the"market.""But"for"that,"the"strong"licensing"requirements"should"be"removed"if"volumes"are"expected"to"decline"further"in"the"future."We"considered"a"scenario"where"bulk"mail"volume"decline"by"40%"compared"to"actual"level"and,"in"this"case,"the"licensing"conditions"are"a"barrier"to"entry."Without" coverage" constraints," the"market" could" become" quite" competitive" even" if" the"entrant" has" a" limited" territorial" coverage." " This" is" undoubtedly" associated" with" the"homogenous" nature" of" the" country"with" a" significant" proportion" of" the"municipalities"characterized"by"a"similar"cost"of"ODW,"implying"that"a"change"in"the"market"conditions"could"have"an"important"impact"on"the"extent"of"entry."""Finally," we" show" that" the" combination" of" eBsubstitution" and" entry" increases" the"incumbent’s" cost"of"ODW"by"52%"because"economies"of" scales" in" the"delivery"activity"can"no"longer"be"exploited.""This"figure"is"a"threat"for"the"future"of"the"universal"service"and" it" would" be" interesting" to" assess" the" impact" of"modifying" the" delivery" frequency"requirement"(currently"5"deliveries"per"week)"on"both"the"incumbent’s"cost"of"ODW"and"the"extent"of"entry"by"the"competitor,"but"this"is"left"for"future"work."Such"future"work"could"also"reflect"the"effects"of"different"delivery"frequencies"and"different"numbers"of"locations"served"on"demand"for"the"entrant’s"service."""
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Appendix"" Table"2:"Hypotheses"
Parameter" Hypothesis" Reference"Postman"salary"per"hour"(euros)" w="28.81" Statbel"Car"cost"per"kilometer"(euros)" pcar=0.36" Tera"Consultants"(2013)"Length"of"the"delivery"round"(km)" Li=1.5li" Jasinski"and"Steggles"(1977)"Speed"(km/h)" !"##$!"# = 4!!"! !!!! < 0.02"" Roy"(1999)"!"##$!"# = 4 + !"!.!"# !!!!! − 0.02 !!"!0.02 < !!!! < 0.3"" "!"##$!"# = 35!!"! !!!! > 0.3"" "!"##$!"#$ = 4!!"! !!!! < 0.02"" "!"##$!"#$ = 4 + !!!.!"# !!!!! − 0.02 !"!0.02 < !!!! < 0.1"" "!"##$!"#$ = 15!!"! !!!! > 0.1"" "!"##$!""# = 4"" "Stop"time"(sec)" !"#$!!"#$!"# = 12 + !! − 1 199 "!"#$!!"#$!"#$ = 20 + (!! − 1) 219 "!"#$!!"#$!""# = 40 + (!! − 1) 409 "
Roy"(1999)"
Delivery"time"(sec)" delivery"time=3"" Roy"(1999)"Maximum"capacity" qmax,foot=400"qmax,bike=400" Roy"(1999)"Loading"time"(sec)" loading"time=600" Tera"Consultants"(2013)"Delivery"frequency"(days/week)" d=5" WIK"(2013)"Items"delivered"per"capita"par"year" x=233" WIK"(2013)"Items"delivered"per"capita"par"day" q=x/(52*d)" "Items"delivered"in"the"area"par"day" Qi=q"popi" ""
)""""
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